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Abstract
We study a model of non-cooperative multilateral unanimity bargaining on a full-dimensional payoff
set. The probability distribution with which the proposing player is selected in each bargaining round fol-
lows an irreducible Markov process. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down with an exogenous
probability and the next round starts with the complementary probability. As the risk of exogenous break-
down vanishes, stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to the weighted Nash bargaining
solution with the stationary distribution of the Markov process as the weight vector.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: C78
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1. Introduction
This paper contributes to the Nash program of supporting solution concepts from cooperative
game theory by obtaining them as equilibrium outcomes of suitably constructed non-cooperative
games. More specifically, we will be concerned with the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.
Consider a situation where two players receive a given pair of payoffs if they disagree, but may
obtain any element of a convex set of other (superior) payoff pairs if they mutually agree on
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product of players’ gains over their disagreement payoff. Nash [20] showed that this is the unique
bargaining solution satisfying the axioms of scale invariance, symmetry, efficiency, and indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives. One can generalize the NBS by assigning different weights to the
players. The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) is that payoff pair which maximizes
a weighted product of players’ gains over their disagreement payoff, see Kalai [12].
The ANBS is used to gain insights on a wide variety of problems in economics. For instance,
Bester [2] compares the effects of different pricing mechanisms on price and quality of a product.
In particular, posted pricing is compared to bargaining between a buyer and a seller. In the latter
case, the ANBS is taken to be the outcome of the bargaining interaction.
Another common application is wage bargaining between a firm and a union: Firm owners
and workers can agree to produce and hence create a surplus. A part of the surplus goes to the
workers as their wage, and the rest goes to the shareholders. If, however, the two sides cannot find
an agreement, the workers may strike or the firm may shut down so that no surplus is generated.
In a seminal paper on wage bargaining, Grout [7] studies the effect of different legal frameworks
on wage bargaining. Throughout the analysis, it is assumed that bargaining between the firm and
the union leads to the outcome predicted by the ANBS.
The prominent use of the ANBS in applications highlights the need for strong non-cooperative
underpinnings of this concept. In the case of the ANBS, it is imperative to examine the non-
cooperative or strategic sources of players’ “bargaining power” which is borne out in the weight
vector of the ANBS. Nash [21] presents a non-cooperative demand game with two players who
are uncertain about which payoff pairs are feasible. In the limit as the uncertainty vanishes, equi-
librium payoffs converge to those predicted by the NBS. Carlsson [4] takes a similar approach,
but with a different source of uncertainty: While the set of feasible payoffs is known to both play-
ers, their actions are subject to noise. If players make demands which do not exhaust the available
surplus, the remainder is distributed according to an exogenously fixed rule. In the limit as the
noise vanishes, there is a unique efficient equilibrium. The payoff pair is a particular ANBS; the
bargaining weights are determined by the exogenous division rule.
In a seminal paper, Rubinstein [22] provides a non-cooperative game in which two players
negotiate on the division of a pie. The players take turns acting as the proposer. The division of the
pie in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium depends upon how strongly players prefer current
over future payoffs. In the limit as players become perfectly patient, the equilibrium division
converges to the NBS. In their discussion of cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to
bargaining, Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky [3] obtain the NBS in the limit if either players’
impatience or the risk of an exogenous breakdown of the negotiations is vanishing.
Although the relationship between cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to bargaining
is well understood for the case of two players, such is far less the case when more than two play-
ers are involved in the negotiation process. While it is straightforward to generalize the ANBS
to n players, the extension of its non-cooperative justification has turned out to be a much more
difficult problem. Krishna and Serrano [14] make use of Lensberg’s [17] stability (consistency)
property. They design a non-cooperative bargaining protocol in which players can exit after par-
tial agreements. This game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and the payoffs implied by
that equilibrium converge to the NBS as the discount factor goes to one. Chae and Yang [5] ob-
tain uniqueness of perfect equilibrium and convergence to the NBS in a game where a proposer
negotiates with one responder at a time. In both papers, the results come at the cost of allowing
partial agreements, rather than requiring unanimous consent to a comprehensive proposal.
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case is implied by the analysis of Hart and Mas-Colell [9]. More recently, support results for the
ANBS have been given by Miyakawa [19] and Laruelle and Valenciano [16]. All these papers
consider a bargaining game where the proposer in each period is drawn from an invariant prob-
ability distribution. The stationary equilibrium payoffs turn out to converge to the ANBS with
that probability distribution as the weight vector. Our analysis covers this result as a special case.
Another special case is a fixed order of proposers, as analyzed by Kultti and Vartiainen [15], who
also show that differentiability of the payoff set’s Pareto frontier is essential for the convergence
result if there are at least three players.
Other strands of the bargaining literature consider much more general bargaining protocols.
For instance, in their analysis of uniqueness and efficiency of equilibria in bargaining games,
Merlo and Wilson [18] assume that both the size of the cake to be divided and the order in
which players propose and respond follow a Markov process. Kalandrakis [13] examines no-
delay equilibria in stationary strategies under a Markov selection protocol, where agreement
does not necessarily require unanimous consent of all players, but only of those within a winning
coalition. The set of such equilibria is characterized and shown to be non-empty. Herings and
Predtetchinski [10] study a game with Markov recognition probabilities, where the set of alter-
natives is one-dimensional. While studying delay or inefficiencies in bargaining games, other
authors have used proposer protocols following stochastic processes, see for instance Cho and
Duggan [6] and Hyndman and Ray [11]. In these papers, the stochastic process is not even re-
quired to have the Markov property, so the choice of the proposer may depend on aspects of
history other than the identity of the previous proposer. Since more general selection protocols
are used in much of the bargaining literature, we find it important to extend this approach to the
support results for the ANBS.
In this paper we take a general approach towards multilateral bargaining. We aim at results
for the case with n players, a general set of feasible payoffs, and a general bargaining protocol.
An informal description of the game we consider in this paper is as follows.
In the first period of an infinitely repeated bargaining game, the identity of the proposer is
completely arbitrary. In each subsequent period, one out of the n players is recognized as the
proposer according to an irreducible Markov process. Upon recognition, the proposer offers a
particular element of a convex and comprehensive set of feasible payoffs. If all players accept the
offer, it is implemented. If a player rejects the offer, with some exogenously given and constant
breakdown probability the game ends, whereas with the complementary probability the next
period starts.
We show that subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies exist and we characterize
the set of such equilibria. We then study the limit of an arbitrary sequence of such equilibria
corresponding to a sequence of vanishing breakdown probabilities. We show that in the limit all
players make the same proposal. Our main result is that in the limit this common proposal coin-
cides with the ANBS with the stationary distribution of the Markov proposer selection process
as the weight vector. Hence, equilibrium payoffs depend only on the set of feasible payoffs and
the stationary distribution associated with the matrix of transition probabilities.
The proof of our result goes well beyond mere technical generalizations of existing proof
strategies. Since the reservation payoff of a responding player depends on the identity of the
current proposer, reservation payoffs cannot be expressed by a single vector, but correspond to
a matrix. For any value of the exogenous breakdown probability, we consider the vectors corre-
sponding to the difference between the equilibrium proposals of a pair of players. We show that
in the limit as the breakdown probability vanishes, these vectors span an (n − 1)-dimensional
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limit proposal of the players. Finally, we demonstrate that the unique normal vector to this sup-
porting hyperplane is proportional to the gradient of the asymmetric Nash product with weights
equal to the stationary distribution associated with the matrix of transition probabilities.
Our analysis includes two very frequently encountered proposer protocols as special cases.
First, consider the protocol where the proposer in each round is drawn from the same probability
distribution. This corresponds to a Markov chain where all the rows of the transition matrix are
the same. Our result implies that stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to the ANBS with the
time-invariant probability distribution as bargaining weights. Consequently, our findings cover
the support results of Hart and Mas-Colell [9], Miyakawa [19], and Laruelle and Valenciano [16].
Second, suppose that players make proposals in some fixed order, which is a straightforward n-
player extension of the alternating-offer protocol in the classical paper by Rubinstein [22]. The
fixed order of proposers induces a stationary distribution of the Markov chain with equal weights
for all players. The limit equilibrium then corresponds to the NBS, the result shown by Kultti
and Vartiainen [15]. In the current paper, we reveal how the aforementioned results are instances
of a much more generally valid principle.
We assume that the set of feasible payoffs is comprehensive from below and that all weakly
Pareto-efficient payoffs are also strongly Pareto-efficient, implying that the relevant bargaining
space is (n − 1)-dimensional. Herings and Predtetchinski [10] consider the same proposer se-
lection protocol as in this paper, but study the case of a 1-dimensional set of alternatives where
players have utility functions that are linear in the distance to their most preferred alternative.
A unique prediction for the equilibrium payoffs is obtained in the limit as the discount factor
goes to one. The equilibrium alternative of the bargaining game is contrasted with the prediction
of both the median voter theorem and the ANBS and it is argued that there are no general rela-
tionships. Full dimensionality of the space of payoffs is therefore crucial to obtain convergence
to ANBS.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the formal description of the bargaining
game and the definition of the equilibrium concept. In Section 3, we give necessary and sufficient
conditions for a profile of stationary strategies to be an equilibrium in accordance with that
concept. We also show that such an equilibrium exists. In Section 4, the main result is established:
our non-cooperative support for the ANBS. Section 5 concludes.
2. The bargaining game
We consider the bargaining game Γ (N,M,V ). The set of players is denoted by N , and its
members are indexed from 1 until n. The game is played for potentially infinitely many periods
t = 0,1,2, . . . . In each period, one player acts as the proposer. In period t = 0, the proposer is
determined in an arbitrary way. In all later periods, the proposer is chosen by a Markov chain.
The probability distribution on the players in period t > 0 depends on the identity of the proposer
in period t − 1. The entry mij of the matrix M is the probability that player j will propose in
period t given that player i has proposed in period t − 1. All entries of M are non-negative and
for each i ∈ N , it is true that ∑nj=1 mij = 1. The set V corresponds to all feasible payoffs. We
denote V ∩ Rn+ by V+. Our assumptions are as follows.
(A1) The set V is closed, convex, and comprehensive from below. The origin lies in the interior
of V . The set V+ is bounded and all weakly Pareto-efficient points in V+ are also strongly
Pareto-efficient.
(A2) The matrix M is irreducible.
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‖η‖ = 1 is said to be normal to the convex set V at a point v̄ ∈ V if (v − v̄)η  0 for every
v ∈ V. The set of all vectors η normal to V at v̄ is called the normal to V at v̄.
(A3) There is a unique vector in the normal to V at every v ∈ ∂V ∩ Rn+.
The assumption that all weakly Pareto-efficient points in V+ are also strongly Pareto-efficient is
essential to our results. As we will show later in Section 3, this assumption implies that a proposal
of a player i gives all other players their respective reservation payoffs. Thus a proposer always
extracts the full surplus from all other players. Our assumptions with respect to V are similar to
those in Merlo and Wilson [18] and Miyakawa [19].
The game proceeds as follows. In any period t , first the proposer is chosen in the aforemen-
tioned way. Next, the proposer offers a vector v ∈ V . Then, all players (including the proposer)
decide sequentially whether to accept or reject the offer v, where for the sake of simplicity we
assume that player i responds before player i + 1. We define the set S(i) consisting of player i
and all its successors by S(i) = {j ∈ N | j  i}. If all players have accepted the vector v in pe-
riod t , the game ends and each player i receives a payoff of vi . As soon as one player rejects v,
period t + 1 starts with probability δ, and the game ends with probability 1 − δ. In the latter case,
as well as in the case of perpetual disagreement, all players receive zero payoff. We assume that
players maximize expected payoffs.
We denote by H pi the set of histories after which player i has to make a proposal and by H
r
i
the set of histories after which player i has to respond to a proposal. Then, a strategy for player i
is a map si : H pi ∪ H ri → V ∪ {Yes,No}, where si(H pi ) ⊂ V and si(H ri ) ⊂ {Yes,No}.
Player i’s strategy is stationary if the same proposal is made at all histories H pi and if the
action taken at any history H ri depends only on the current proposal and the current proposer.
2
A Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies from which no player has an incentive to unilat-
erally deviate. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) is a profile of strategies such that its
restriction to any subgame is a Nash equilibrium of that subgame.
A stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPE) is a profile of stationary strategies
which is an SPE.
3. Analysis of stationary equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies.
Theorem 3.11 gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy profile to be an SSPE
and Theorem 3.12 asserts that an SSPE exists.
The analysis in this section resembles Kalandrakis [13], but some important differences
should be noted: We conclude rather than assume that agreement is immediate in SSPE and we
do not impose assumptions on the behavior of players who are indifferent between acceptance
and rejection of some proposal. Furthermore, Banks and Duggan [1] have given an equilibrium
2 This notion of stationarity is weaker than the notion of subgame consistency due to Harsanyi and Selten [8], which
implies that a player chooses the same action at any two nodes for which the continuation game is the same. For instance,
suppose that rows i and j of M are identical. Then, the continuation games after rejection of player i’s proposal and that
after rejection of player j ’s proposal are identical. Yet, our definition allows Ai
k
to be different from Aj
k
for one or more
players k ∈ N .
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tocol under consideration here.
Consider a profile of stationary strategies. It can be described by an (n × n)-matrix Θ , where
the entry θij is the payoff proposed to player j by player i, and a collection A of n2 acceptance
sets, where the acceptance set Aij is the set of vectors in V which player j will accept when
proposed by player i. The set of vectors in V accepted by player j and his successors, if proposed
by i, is Ai
S(j)
= ⋂k∈S(j) Aik. We refer to Ai = AiS(1) = ⋂j∈N Aij as the social acceptance set for
proposer i.
Suppose that in period t , the proposal of player i is rejected. With probability 1 − δ the game
ends and all players receive zero payoff, and with probability δ period t + 1 is reached and play
proceeds according to the profile (Θ, A) of stationary strategies. The expected payoff to player j
after rejection is rij (Θ, A). Omitting the argument (Θ, A) from the notation wherever possible,
we refer to rij as the reservation payoff of player j when i proposes.
Proposition 3.1. The reservation payoff ri belongs to int(V ).
Proof. Conditional on the next period being reached, the payoffs are determined by a proba-
bility distribution on V (notice that also 0 ∈ V ), so expected payoffs belong to V since V is
convex. Since with probability 1 − δ the next period is not reached, these expected payoffs equal
δ−1ri , so δ−1ri ∈ V. Since 0 ∈ int(V ), the convex combination (1 − δ)0 + δδ−1ri = ri belongs
to int(V ). 
One implication of Proposition 3.1 is that a proposer always has the option to make a proposal
that strictly exceeds the reservation payoff of every player.
Proposition 3.2. In SSPE, for j ∈ N, if v ∈ AiS(j), then vk  rik for all k ∈ S(j).
Proof. Suppose that (Θ, A) is a profile of stationary strategies such that v ∈ Ai
S(j)
but vk < rik
for some player k ∈ S(j). Consider a history in H rk , where player k responds to the proposal v
made by player i. At that history player k could deviate from (Θ, A) by rejecting v. In that case,
an expected payoff of rik would result. Hence, this deviation is profitable and (Θ, A) cannot be
an SSPE. 
Proposition 3.2 implies that for a vector of payoffs v to belong to the social acceptance set, it
should satisfy vj  rij for all j ∈ N.
Proposition 3.3. In SSPE (a) if v ∈ V is such that vn > rin, then v ∈ Ain, and (b) for each j =
1, . . . , n − 1 if v ∈ AiS(j+1) is such that vj > rij , then v ∈ Aij .
Proof. To prove part (a) of the proposition suppose that v ∈ V satisfies vn > rin. Consider a
history where player n has to respond to the proposal v of player i. If n accepts, the proposal will
be implemented, so a payoff of vn will result, which is strictly greater than the payoff rin which
would result from a rejection. Therefore, SSPE requires that v ∈ Ain.
To prove part (b) take a j = 1, . . . , n − 1 and a v ∈ AiS(j+1) such that vj > rij . Consider a
history where player j responds to the proposal v of player i. If player j accepts, the proposal
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of rij , SSPE requires that v ∈ Aij . 
Proposition 3.3 established a kind of converse of Proposition 3.2. One implication of Proposi-
tion 3.3 is that a vector v ∈ V that satisfies vj > rij for all j ∈ N belongs to the social acceptance
set Ai.
Proposition 3.4. In SSPE, each player’s proposal θi lies in the social acceptance set Ai for
proposer i.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that under some SSPE there is a player i ∈ N such
that θi /∈ Ai . Consider the subgame starting at a history where player i is the proposer. Since
θi is rejected, ri is the vector of expected payoffs by definition. By Proposition 3.1, ri ∈ int(V ).
Consequently, there exists v ∈ V such that vj > rij for all j ∈ N . By the previous proposition,
v ∈ Ai . Hence, it would be a profitable deviation for player i to propose v instead of θi . 
Proposition 3.5. In SSPE, θij  0 and rij  0 for all (i, j) ∈ N × N .
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that (Θ, A) is an SSPE and that θij < 0 for some (i, j) ∈
N × N . Consider a history where player j has to respond to the proposal θi . By Proposition 3.4,
θi ∈ Ai , so player j will receive a strictly negative payoff if play proceeds according to (Θ, A).
But then, it would be a profitable deviation for player j to reject the proposal. Consequently, it
holds that θij  0 for all (i, j) ∈ N × N. It then follows that rij  0 for all (i, j) ∈ N × N. 
The next proposition shows that an equilibrium proposal of any player gives all other players
their respective reservation payoffs. Thus a proposer always extracts the entire surplus from the
other players.
Proposition 3.6. In SSPE, θij = rij for all (i, j) ∈ N × N such that i 
= j .
Proof. Since θi ∈ Ai by Proposition 3.4, Proposition 3.2 implies that θij  rij for all j ∈ N .
Suppose θik > r
i
k for some k ∈ N such that k 
= i. Define the vector v as follows,
vj =
{
θii if j = i,
rij if j 
= i.
The vector v is clearly non-negative and it is in V , because v  θi and V is comprehensive.
Furthermore, vk = rik < θik , so the vector v is dominated by θi and is therefore not strongly
Pareto-efficient. Since we assume that all weakly Pareto-efficient vectors of V+ are also strongly
Pareto-efficient, the vector v is not weakly Pareto-efficient. Thus, there exists a vector v′ such
that v′j > vj for all j ∈ N .
We show now that v′ ∈ Ai . Indeed, v′j > vj = rij for all j 
= i. And for player i we have the
inequality v′i > vi = θii  rii . Thus we conclude that v′j > rij for all j ∈ N . Proposition 3.3 now
implies that v′ ∈ Ai , as desired.
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proposal, namely propose the vector v′ rather than θi . Indeed, the vector v′ is accepted and
results in a payoff of v′i > θ
i
i to player i. 
Proposition 3.7 claims that all players make a proposal belonging to the boundary of V.
Proposition 3.7. In SSPE, θi ∈ ∂V for each i ∈ N .
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there is a player i ∈ N such that θi ∈ int(V ). Equiv-
alently, there exists v ∈ V such that vj > θij for all j ∈ N . By the immediate agreement property,
θi ∈ Ai . This implies that v ∈ Ai as well. But then it would be a profitable deviation for player i
to propose v rather than θi . 
The previous propositions are collected in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.8. Suppose (Θ, A) is an SSPE profile inducing reservation payoffs ri . For each i ∈ N











v ∈ V ∣∣ vk  rik}, j ∈ N, (3.4)
Ain ⊃
{




∣∣ vj > rij}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. (3.6)
In what follows, we establish the converse; the conditions of Theorem 3.8 characterize the set
of SSPE. To do so, we will first state the well-known one-shot deviation principle.
Proposition 3.9. Let (Θ, A) be a stationary strategy profile satisfying (3.1)–(3.6). If there is a
subgame such that some player has a profitable deviation, then there is a subgame where he has
a profitable one-shot deviation.
Here, a one-shot deviation in a subgame is a single deviation by the player at the root of the
subgame. The proof of this principle is standard in the literature and is based on the optimality
principle from dynamic programming. We will show next that no player has a profitable one-shot
deviation from a profile of strategies satisfying conditions (3.1)–(3.6).
Proposition 3.10. Let (Θ, A) be a stationary strategy profile satisfying (3.1)–(3.6). There is no
subgame where a player has a profitable one-shot deviation.
Proof. Consider the subgame at a history h ∈ H pi . Suppose player i has a one-shot deviation
involving a proposal vi different from θi . If vi does not belong to Ai, it leads to a payoff rii for
player i. Since θi = ri for all j 
= i and ri ∈ int(V ), the Pareto-efficiency of θi implies θi > ri,j j i i
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= i, vij  rij = θij . Now vii  θii ,
since otherwise the Pareto-efficiency of θi would be violated. The deviation is not profitable.
Consider a subgame at a history h ∈ H rj where player j has to respond to a proposal v made
by player i. If j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and v /∈ AiS(j+1), then either action by player j leads to a payoff
of rij and hence the deviation is not profitable. Suppose now that either j = n or j ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}
and v ∈ AiS(j+1). If v ∈ Aij then the original strategy leads to a payoff of vj while the deviation
yields a payoff of rij . Since vj  rij by condition (3.4), the deviation is not profitable. If v /∈ Aij
then the original strategy leads to a payoff of rij while the deviation yields a payoff of vj . Since
vj  rij by conditions (3.5)–(3.6), the deviation is not profitable. 
The previous two propositions imply that the strategies conforming to the conditions of The-
orem 3.8 are subgame perfect. Since they are also stationary, we have the following.
Theorem 3.11. The strategy profile (Θ, A) fulfills conditions (3.1)–(3.6) if and only if it is an
SSPE.
If a matrix Θ of proposals is part of an SSPE, then it is part of many SSPE’s. This inessential
multiplicity has two sources. First, if a responding player is proposed exactly the reservation pay-
off, then our characterization restricts behavior only if the proposal on the table is the equilibrium
proposal. This is reflected by the fact that each point on the boundary of the social acceptance
set (except the relevant equilibrium proposal) may or may not be an element of that set in SSPE.
Second, if a proposal lies outside a social acceptance set, it is indeterminate which player will
reject the proposal. Consider for example the case where N = {1,2,3,4} and r1 = (1,1,1,1).
Now suppose that player 1 has proposed v = (2,2,0,0) in some subgame. Since v3 < r13 and
v4 < r
1
4 , Proposition 3.2 implies that v /∈ A1, and by Proposition 3.4 v 
= θ1. It is also true that
v /∈ A14: If the node where player 4 has to respond is reached, that player effectively chooses
between a payoff of 1 and a payoff of 0, so SSPE requires rejection of the proposal. However, the
SSPE characterization leaves indeterminate whether players 1, 2, and 3 will accept or reject v.
Consequently, there is an SSPE for any configuration of responses by these players. In particular,
player 3 may accept v in SSPE although v3 < r13 , and player 2 may reject v although v2 > r
1
2 .
This reasoning even extends to player 1: In SSPE, it is possible that v /∈ A11 although v1 > r11 and
player 1 is the proposer. However, this does not mean that player 1 may reject his own proposal
on the equilibrium path, since the SSPE characterization requires the specific proposal θ1 to be
made and immediately accepted by all players.
Theorem 3.12. An SSPE exists.
For a proof of SSPE existence, we refer to Kalandrakis [13].
4. The limit equilibrium
Our proofs so far did not rely on Assumptions (A2) and (A3). They will be needed for the
results of this section. Since the matrix M is irreducible, it has a unique stationary distribution
denoted by μ. Recall that the stationary distribution μ is a probability distribution on the set
of players N satisfying the equation μM = μ. Furthermore, irreducibility of M implies that all
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i ∈ N . If the matrix M was reducible, the state space of M could be partitioned into several
communicating classes. In this case, one obtains results analogous to those in the sequel within
each communicating class.
Theorem 4.2 below is the main result of the paper. As the continuation probability goes to
one, along any sequence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria of Γ , the equilibrium proposal
of all players converges to the same limit. This common limit is the asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution weighted by the stationary distribution μ, denoted μ-ANBS.







The μ-ANBS is the unique maximizer of the function ρ on the set V+.
Theorem 4.2. Let {δh}h∈N be a sequence of continuation probabilities in [0,1) converging to 1.
For each h, let Θ(δh) be a matrix of proposals in some SSPE of the game Γ with continuation
probability δh. Then the limits limh→∞ θi(δh) exist for each i ∈ N . All limits are equal to the
μ-ANBS.
Let δh and Θ(δh) be as in Theorem 4.2. The sequence {Θ(δh)} has a convergent subsequence,
as it lies in the compact set V n+, the Cartesian product of n copies of V+. For the remainder of
this section, we will fix any such convergent subsequence and denote its limit by Θ̄ . Since the
convergent subsequence considered is arbitrary, to prove Theorem 4.2 it is sufficient to show that
each column of the matrix Θ̄ is the μ-ANBS.
We now give a brief overview of the argument. First we show that along the sequence {Θ(δh)}
of equilibria the proposals of all players converge to a common limit, say the point θ̄ ∈ V . We
then compute the tangent space to the set ∂V at the point θ̄ by considering the pairwise differ-
ences of the equilibrium proposals of players i and n, and show they converge to zero at the same
speed as 1−δh. In fact, we are able to compute the limits of the vectors (θ i(δh)−θn(δh))/(1−δh)
explicitly, which are then shown to span the tangent space to the set ∂V at the point θ̄ . Using this
result we show next that the tangent space at θ̄ is orthogonal to the gradient of the asymmetric
Nash product with weights μ, thereby showing that θ̄ is the μ-ANBS.
Proposition 4.3. All columns of Θ̄ are identical.
Proof. For any i 







Suppose that, contrary to the proposition, not all limit proposals θ̄1, . . . , θ̄n are the same. Let
j ∈ N be such that in the limit not all players propose the same to player j, and choose θ̄j to be
either mini∈N {θ̄ ij } or maxi∈N {θ̄ ij }, whichever is not equal to θ̄ jj . Define N = {i ∈ N | θ̄ ij = θ̄j }.
For any i ∈ N, we have




























which contradicts the fact that either θ̄j < θ̄
k
j for all k ∈ N \ N or θ̄j > θ̄kj for all k ∈ N \ N.
Therefore, mik = 0 for all (i, k) ∈ N × (N\N) and thus N is an absorbing set. Since N 
= N ,
this contradicts the irreducibility assumption on M . 







Let D(δh) be the (n × (n − 1))-matrix with columns d1(δh), . . . , dn−1(δh).
The rest of the proof is organized as follows. In Proposition 4.5 we compute the limits
of di(δh) as h goes to infinity. Proposition 4.6 establishes that the limit of {di(δh)} belongs
to the tangent space to ∂V at θ̄ . We then proceed to show in Proposition 4.8 that the limits
of d1(δh), . . . , dn−1(δh) are linearly independent and thus span the tangent space to ∂V at θ̄ .
And finally, Proposition 4.9 establishes that the gradient of the Nash product with weights μ at
the point θ̄ is orthogonal to the tangent space of V, thereby showing that θ̄ is the μ-ANBS.
For a matrix A, we denote by A−i and A−i the matrix A without its ith row and column,
respectively. We write 1 for a column vector of ones and I for the identity matrix.
For j ∈ N, we define the matrix L(j) by
L(j) = [M − I ]−j−n.
Thus L(j) is the ((n − 1) × (n − 1))-matrix obtained from M − I by deleting column j and
row n. Proposition 4.4 is an auxiliary result used in the proof of Proposition 4.5.
Proposition 4.4. The matrix L(j) is invertible for all j ∈ N.
Proof. Suppose L(j) is singular. Let a be a non-zero vector such that [M − I ]−j−na = 0. Since
the elements in any column of the matrix M − I add up to zero, we also have the equation
(M − I )−jn a = 0, so [M − I ]−j a = 0. By using [M − I ]−j = (M − I )I−j and defining
b = I−j a, we see that (M − I )b = 0. Thus the vector b is an eigenvector of M associated
with eigenvalue 1. By the Perron–Frobenius theorem, any non-zero eigenvector of M associ-
ated with eigenvalue 1 is a strictly positive vector. However, since bj = 0, we have obtained a
contradiction. Consequently, the matrix L(j) is invertible. 
1962 V. Britz et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010) 1951–1967Proposition 4.5. The sequence {D(δh)} of matrices converges to the matrix D̄ with rows given
by d̄j = θ̄j1L−1(j) for j ∈ N .
Proof. We fix h and denote δh by δ, θ i(δh) by θi, and di(θh) by di.
For each j ∈ N and i ∈ N \ {j,n},












) + δθnj − θnj ,
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j + (δmii − 1)dij , j ∈ N, i ∈ N \ {j,n}. (4.1)























) + (1 − δ)θnj ,
where we use conditions (3.1) and (3.5) for the first equality, so
d
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j + θnj .






j , j ∈ N \ {n}. (4.2)




δM − I)−j−n, j ∈ N.
The matrix (M − I )−j−n is invertible by Proposition 4.4, and so is the matrix (δM − I )−j−n for δ
close enough to one. Thus, for every j ∈ N, we can solve the above system for dj as
dj = θn1
[(
δM − I)−j ]−1.j −n
V. Britz et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010) 1951–1967 1963As δh goes to one, the sequence θnj (δh) converges to θ̄j by Proposition 4.3. Thus the sequence
dj (δh) converges to θ̄j1L−1(j), as desired. 
Proposition 4.5 expresses each row j of the matrix D̄ as the sum of the rows of the matrix
L−1(j) multiplied by the scalar θ̄j .
We show now that each column of the matrix D̄ is orthogonal to the normal vector of V at the
point θ̄ , which is unique by Assumption (A3). This is equivalent to saying that each column of
the matrix D̄ belongs to the tangent space of ∂V at θ̄ . We let span(D̄) denote the column span
of the matrix D̄.
Proposition 4.6. It holds that span(D̄) is orthogonal to the normal vector of V at θ̄ .
Proof. Let ηi(δh) denote the normal vector of V at the point θi(δh). Since {θi(δh)} converges
to θ̄ , the sequence {ηi(δh)} converges to η̄, the normal vector to the set V at the point θ̄ . By the
definition of the normal vector,
ηn(δh)
(θi(δh) − θn(δh))  0 and ηi(δh)(θi(δh) − θn(δh))  0.
Dividing by 1 − δh and passing to the limit yields the inequalities η̄d̄ i  0 and η̄d̄ i  0,
therefore η̄d̄ i = 0, as desired. 
Propositions 4.7 and 4.8 address the dimension of span(D̄). We show that the columns of D̄
are linearly independent, thus establishing that span(D̄) equals the tangent space of ∂V at θ̄ .
For j ∈ N, let Kj be the sum of the rows of the matrix L−1(j), thus
Kj = 1L−1(j).
Define K as the (n × (n − 1))-matrix with rows Kj . Proposition 4.7 expresses all rows of K in
terms of rows of L−1(n) and the stationary distribution μ induced by M.
Proposition 4.7. Any combination of n− 1 distinct rows of the matrix K is linearly independent.
Furthermore,






, j ∈ N \ {n}.
























1964 V. Britz et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010) 1951–1967The formula above is well-known in linear programming and is used to compute the simplex
tableau following from a change in basis variables. By definition of the stationary distribution
we have
L(n)μ−n + xμn = 0.
We multiply this expression by L−1(n) and rearrange to obtain
L−1(n)x = − 1
μn
μ−n.




(L−1(n))1 − μ1μj (L−1(n))j
...
(L−1(n))j−1 − μj−1μj (L−1(n))j
(L−1(n))j+1 − μj+1μj (L−1(n))j
...
































where C is the (n − 1)-diagonal matrix with element 1/μi in column i.
The matrix [11 − C] is non-singular. Suppose not, then there is y 
= 0 such that
[11 − C]y = 0. It follows that 11y = Cy = (y1/μ1, . . . , yn−1/μn−1), from which it fol-
lows in particular that 1y 
= 0. By pre-multiplying the last equality with the row vector
(μ1, . . . ,μn−1), we find that (1 − μn)1y = 1y, a contradiction since μn > 0. Consequently,
the matrix [11 − C] is non-singular.
It follows that K−n is non-singular. Since the labeling of players is arbitrary, we have shown
that any combination of n − 1 distinct rows of the matrix K is linearly independent. 
Proposition 4.8. It holds that θ̄i > 0 for all i ∈ N . The column span of the matrix D̄ has dimen-
sion n − 1.
Proof. We know that θ̄i  0 for each i ∈ N . Partition N into the set N0 of players i such that
θ̄i = 0 and the set N+ of players i such that θ̄i > 0.
Suppose that the set N0 is non-empty, so that the set N+ consists of at most n − 1 elements.
We show first that θ̄ ∈ span(D̄) by constructing a vector z ∈ Rn−1 such that D̄z = θ̄ . Since the
rows Ki of the matrix K corresponding to the elements i of the set N+ are linearly independent
by Proposition 4.7, there exists a vector z ∈ Rn−1 such that Kiz = 1 for all i ∈ N+. Then d̄iz =
V. Britz et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010) 1951–1967 1965θ̄iKiz = θ̄i for all i ∈ N+. Trivially, z also satisfies the equations d̄iz = θ̄iKiz = 0 = θ̄i for each
i ∈ N0.
Let η be the normal vector to V at the point θ̄ . Since η is orthogonal to span(D̄) by Proposi-
tion 4.6, we have ηθ̄ = 0. Since zero is in the interior of V by assumption, the vector εη is in the
set V for ε > 0 small enough. But then we have the inequality η(εη − θ̄ ) = ε(ηη) > 0, con-
tradicting the definition of a normal vector. Consequently, the set N0 is empty. We have shown
the first part of the proposition.
To prove the second part of the proposition, notice that D̄ can be written as the product T K ,
where T is a diagonal matrix with θ̄i in column i. Since θ̄i > 0 for each i ∈ N , the matrix T has
full rank n, and the matrix K has rank n − 1 by Proposition 4.7. This establishes the second part
of the proposition. 
We now proof that the gradient of the logarithm of the asymmetric Nash product with weights





Proposition 4.9. It holds that span(D̄) is orthogonal to the gradient of the function lnρ at the
point θ̄ .
Proof. The gradient of lnρ at θ̄ is the vector g given by gj = μj/θ̄j , j ∈ N. We have the



























= 1L−1(n) − 1L−1(n) = 0,
where the first equality uses the result of Proposition 4.5, and the second one Proposition 4.7.
This establishes the proposition. 
The proof of Theorem 4.2 is now immediate. The column span of the matrix D̄ is orthogonal
to the normal vector of V at θ̄ by Proposition 4.6, and at the same time it is orthogonal to the
gradient of lnρ at θ̄ by Proposition 4.9. Since span(D̄) has dimension n − 1 (Proposition 4.8),
it follows at once that the gradient of the function lnρ is proportional to the normal vector to V
at θ̄ . Hence, the point θ̄ is the maximizer of the function lnρ on the strictly positive vectors in
the set V, as well as the maximizer of the function ρ on the set V+.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have provided further non-cooperative support to the asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solution. We demonstrate that existing results are instances of a much more generally
1966 V. Britz et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010) 1951–1967valid principle. We consider a bargaining process involving any number of players, an arbitrary
irreducible Markov process that determines the selection of the proposer, and any set of feasible
payoffs that is bounded, convex, and has a smooth boundary. As long as no agreement is reached,
negotiations break down with some fixed probability.
We fully characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. We show
that at least one such equilibrium exists and argue that in general there are many such equilibria.
We continue by studying the limit of an arbitrary sequence of equilibria when the probability
of breakdown goes to zero. We establish that in the limit all players make the same proposal.
Moreover, this proposal is the same as the one corresponding to the asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution, where the weights in the Nash product are equal to the stationary distribution of the
Markov process that determines the selection of the proposer.
One implication is that if players are selected as proposer in some fixed order, then the sym-
metric Nash bargaining solution is achieved in the limit. This can be seen as a generalization
of alternating offer bargaining to more than two players. Another implication is that if players
are selected according to time-invariant probabilities, these probabilities are equal to the weights
in the Nash product. The symmetric Nash bargaining solution would again result if the time-
invariant probabilities are uniform.
It is noteworthy that the bargaining power of the players is only affected by the stationary
distribution of the proposer selection process. The particular shape of the set of feasible payoffs
is irrelevant for the weights of the players in the Nash product, as are the particular probabilities
by which the proposer in the next period is chosen conditional on the current proposer.
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